Law Journal: “Are Charter Schools the Second Coming of Enron?”

Enron’s collapse was significant because it exposed the deficiencies of gatekeep- ers that had the responsibility of protecting the integrity of the markets.13 These gate-keepers included Enron’s auditor Arthur Andersen, independent analysts, credit rat- ing agencies, corporate boards, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).14 In the case of the Enron debacle, all of these watchdogs failed to detect thedangers caused by Fastow’s conflict of interest.

Related-party transactions are now posing a threat to the charter school sector. Charter schools are a deregulated departure from traditional public schools because they are exempted from laws governing budgets and financial transparency.15 Similar to Fastow, unscrupulous individuals and corporations are using their control over charter schools and their affiliates to obtain unreasonable management fees for their services and funnel money intended for charter schools into other business ventures.16

In spite of this evidence, the federal government has consistently attempted to increase the number of charter schools without pushing for oversight.17 This policy approach is alarming because it will create more opportunities for illegal related- party transactions.18 Also, this approach runs the risk of harming students in low- income and minority communities—the very children whom charter schools are sup- posed to serve.19 Therefore, charter school gatekeepers must learn from the Enron debacle by becoming more prepared to guard against the dangers posed by related- party transactions.20 These gatekeepers include auditors, governing boards, authoriz- ers, state education agencies (SEAs), and the U.S. Department of Education.

In this Article, we discuss how some charter school officials have engaged in Enron-like related-party transactions to defraud charter schools. We also identify several measures that can be taken to strengthen the ability of charter school gate- keepers to protect against this danger. This Article is divided into four Parts. Part I describes how Fastow used his management of Enron and the SPEs to obtain illegal profits contrary to the interests of the former company. Part II discusses why the gatekeepers in the financial sector failed to stop the related-party transactions be- tween Enron and the LJM entities. Part III provides examples of how individuals in the charter school sector are benefitting from their control over charter schools and their affiliates in a manner similar to Fastow. Part IV analyzes, inter alia, pertinent statutory and regulatory provisions that apply to state and federal gatekeepers. We perform this task to identify the steps that legislators and policymakers can take to increase the gatekeepers’ ability to protect against harmful related-party transactions.

If you want to understand the deep potential for financial corruption at the heart of deregulated private charter schools, you must read this article.

Source: Dianeravitch.net

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